Crito Dialogue Ending

Ending of The Crito Dialogue Simplified

 

Soc. Are we to say that we are never intentionally to do wrong?

Is doing wrong always evil and dishonorable, as I was just now saying, and as has been already acknowledged by us

Are we to rest assured, in spite of the opinion of the many, and in spite of consequences whether better or worse, that injustice is always an evil and dishonor to him who acts unjustly? Shall we affirm that?

Cr. Yes.

Soc. Then we must do no wrong?

Cr. Certainly not.

Soc. Nor when injured injure in return, as the many imagine; for we must injure no one at all?

Cr. Clearly not.

Soc. Again, Crito, may we do evil?

Cr. Surely not, Socrates.

Soc. And what of doing evil in return for evil, which is the morality of the many-is that just or not?

Cr. Not just.

Soc. For doing evil to another is the same as injuring him?

Cr. Very true.

Soc. Then we ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil to anyone, whatever evil we may have suffered from him. But I would have you consider, Crito, whether you really mean what you are saying. For this opinion has never been held, and never will be held, by any considerable number of persons; and those who are agreed and those who are not agreed upon this point have no common ground, and can only despise one another, when they see how widely they differ.

Tell me, then, whether you agree with my first principle, that neither injury nor retaliation nor warding off evil by evil is ever right. And shall that be the premise of our agreement?

Or do you disagree with this?

 

Cr. I agree with this.

Soc. Then I will proceed to the next step, which may be put in the form of a question: Should a man do what he admits to be right, or should he to betray the right?

Cr. He should do what he thinks right.

Soc. In leaving the prison against the will of the Athenians, do I wrong any? or rather do I not wrong those whom I ought least to wrong? Do I not desert the principles which were acknowledged by us to be just? What do you say?

Cr. I cannot tell, Socrates, for I do not know.

Soc. Then consider the matter in this way: Imagine that I am about to play truant (you may call the proceeding by any name which you like), and the laws and the government come and interrogate me:

 

The law says to me, "Tell us, Socrates are you going to overturn us- the laws and the whole State? Do you imagine that a State can subsist and not be overthrown, in which the decisions of law have no power, but are set aside and overthrown by individuals?"

What will be our answer, Crito, to these and the like words? Anyone will recognize the evil of acting against the law; and we might reply, "Yes; but the law has injured us and imprisoned us unjustly." Suppose I say that?

Cr. Very good, Socrates.

Soc. And the law would say, “Socrates, you are in the habit of asking and answering questions. Tell us what complaint you have to make against us? Why do you think you are justified in attempting to destroy us and the State? In the first place did we not bring you into existence? Your father married your mother by our aid and begat you. Say whether you have any objection to urge against those of us who regulate marriage?" None, I should reply. "Or against those of us who regulate the system of nurture and education of children in which you were trained? Were not the laws of Athens, right in commanding your father to train you in music and gymnastic?" Right, I should reply. "Well, then, since you were brought into the world and nurtured and educated by us, can you deny in the first place that you are a child of Athens, as your fathers were before you? And if this is true you are not on equal terms with us; nor can you think that you have a right to do to us what we are doing to you. Would you have any right to strike or revile or do any other evil to a father or to your master, if you had one, when you have been struck or reviled by him, or received some other evil at his hands?- you would not say this? And because we think right to destroy you, do you think that you have any right to destroy us in return, and your country as far as in you lies? And will you, O professor of true virtue, say that you are justified in this?

 

 

Has a philosopher like you failed to discover that our country is more to be valued and higher and holier than mother or father or any ancestor?

Whether in battle or in a court of law, or in any other place, a citizen must do what his city and his country order him;

or he must change the city’s view of justice

and if he may do no violence to his father or mother, he may do no violence to his country."

What answer shall we make to this, Crito? Do the laws speak truly, or do they not?

Cr. I think that they do.

Soc. Then the laws will say: "Consider, Socrates, if you attempt to escape, you are going to do us wrong. For, after having brought you into the world, and nurtured and educated you, and given you and every other citizen a share in every good that we had to give, we further proclaim and give the right to every Athenian, that if he does not like us when he has come of age and has seen the ways of the city, he may go where he pleases and take his goods with him; and none of our laws will forbid him or interfere with him. Any of you who does not like us and the city, and who wants to go to a colony or to any other city, may go where he likes, and take his goods with him. But he who has lived in Athens and experienced our laws, and still remains, has entered into an implied contract that he will do as the law commands him.

If you disobey the law, you are wrong in three ways: first, because in disobeying the law you are disobeying the city that has been like a parent to you; second, because the law has created this city and has educated you; third, because by living here, you have made an agreement with us that you will obey our commands; and he neither obeys them nor convinces us that our commands are wrong; and we give him the alternative of obeying or convincing us; that is what we offer and he does neither.

These are the sort of accusations to which, as we were saying, you, Socrates, will be exposed if you accomplish your intentions; you, above all other Athenians."

Must we not agree?

Cr. There is no help, Socrates.

Soc. Then will they not say: "You, Socrates, are breaking the covenants and agreements which you made with us. You had seventy years to think of them, during which time you were free to leave the city if our covenants appeared to you to be unfair. You had your choice, and might have gone either to Lacedaemon or Crete, which you often praise for their good government, or to some other Hellenic or foreign State. But you stayed in Athens, so you must love her laws. And now you run away and forsake your agreements. Not so, Socrates, if you will take our advice; do not make yourself ridiculous by escaping out of the city.


"Listen, then, Socrates, to us who have brought you up. Think of justice first, that you may be justified before the princes of the world below. For neither will you nor any that belong to you be happier or holier or juster in this life, or happier in another, if you try to escape. Now you leave life in innocence, a sufferer and not a doer of evil; a victim, not of the laws, but of men. But if you escape, returning evil for evil, and injury for injury, breaking the covenants and agreements which you have made with us, and wronging those whom you ought least to wrong, that is to say, yourself, your friends, your country, and us, we shall be angry with you while you live, and our brethren, the laws in the world below, will receive you as an enemy; for they will know that you have done your best to destroy us. Listen, then, to us and not to Crito."

 

Cr. I have nothing to say, Socrates.

Soc. Then let me follow the intimations of the will of God.